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THE DESIGN OF A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE VIBRATION 
MONITORING OF TURBINE GENERATORS 
M.Todd, S.D.J.McArthur, G.M.West, J.R.McDonald, S.J.Shaw. J.A.Hart 
ABSTRACT 
Condition Monitoring (CM) systems monitor the health of expensive plant items such as turbine generators. They 
interpret turbine parameters by signaling an alarm when pre-defined limits are breached. Often these alarms have no 
further operational consequence but still require investigation by an expert. This i s  a time consuming and laborious 
process due to the volume of data interpreted for each alarm. In order to reduce the burden of alarm assessment, a 
Decision Support System (DSS) is proposed. The DSS will feature a Routine Alarm Assessment (RAA) module which 
provides an initial analysis of the alarms, highlighting those with no further operational consequence and enabling the 
expert to focus on those which indicate a genuine problem with the turbine. The structured approach taken to capture 
and document the expert knowledge on RAA along with the generation of a module specification and the selected IS 
techniques are outlined. The implementation of an RAA prototype is discussed along with how this will act as a 
foundation for a full alarm interpretation and fault diagnostic system. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Condition Monitoring (CM) systems are used to 
monitor the health of expensive plant items such as 
turbine generators. These systems collect and interpret 
a large amount of data relating to plant parameters, 
including vibration, eccentricity, oil temperature and 
governor valve positions. CM experts analyse the data 
in order to locate problems emerging on the turbine. 
Variations arise in the level of data interpretation 
camed out by each CM system, Systems which 
perform high level interpretation on data are those 
which fire an alarm when pre-defined limits are 
breached on selected parameters 111 for the expert to 
then analyse and interpret the data. More advanced CM 
systems utilise Intelligent System (IS) techniques to 
automate elements of the analysis and interpretation 
[2][31 in order to provide diagnostic support to the 
experts. This type of system is also often referred to as 
an Expert System (ES). 
This paper outlines the design of a Routine Alarm 
Assessment (RAA) module. This module is one of 
four Decision Support System (DSS) modules, which 
will act as an interpretation layer to an existing CM 
system by applying IS techniques to analyse the data 
and provide support for the experts. 
Sections 2 & 3 describe the existing CM architecture 
that the DSS will be applied to and the associated 
problems to be addressed by the DSS. The four DSS 
modules and their functionality are outlined in section 
4. A structured approach adopted in the design of the 
M A  module is shown in figure 1 and is explained in 
sections 5 , 6  and 7. Capturing the experts’ knowledge 
through knowledge elicitation [4] and then 
documenting and validating the knowledge onto 
transcripts is described in section 5.  Section 6 outlines 
the experts’ approach to alarm assessment realised 
through the knowledge elicitation and validation stage. 
Section 7 then explains how the experts’ approach to 
alarm assessment was modelled and validated using the 
CommonKADS methodology [4], which then acts as a 
blueprint for the RAA module design. Section 8 
discusses how the RAA module will act as the 
foundation for the three remaining modules in order to 
realise a full alarm interpretation and fault diagnostic 
system. 
Figure 1: Approach to Routine Alarm Assessment 
Module Design 
2. EXISTING CONDITION MONITORING 
ARCHITECTURE 
The DSS is to be applied to a British Energy (BE) 
turbine CM network shown in figure 2. The turbine 
consists of a High Pressure (W) rotor, an Intermediate 
Pressure (IP) rotor and two Low Pressure (LP) rotors. 
Transducers are positioned on the turbine to measure 
vibration and eccentricity values. Static measurements 
such as generator load. oil temperatures and governor 
valve positions are also recorded. These are referred to 
as static measurements since they have little variation 
over time compared to vibration and eccentricity 
measurements. A signal is passed to the Central 
Control Room (CCR) when a vibration or eccentricity 
signal exceeds a pre-defined Turbine Supervisory 
Equipment (TSE) alarm limit. 
BE installs turbine CM systems to provide the expert 
with the necessary data to develop an understanding of 
the current health of the turbine. The CM system used 
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by BE records and displays signal variations over time, 
which enables the expert to view changes and trends 
within the data. 
Figure 2: Existing Condition Monitoring 
Architecture 
The CM system, shown in Figure 2 records vibration 
and eccentricity signals along with static signals. 
Alarm limits are set on the overall magnitude of the 
vibration and eccentricity measurements. Limits are 
also set to monitor vibrations occumng at sub- 
harmonic frequencies, vibrations occurring at multiples 
of the operating frequency and step changes. If a limit 
is breached then an alarm is triggered and logged 
within the CM system for further investigation at a 
later date. This system is linked into the company 
intranet to allow the data to be accessed from anywhere 
in the organisation. 
3. CONDITION MONITORING PROCESS 
An expert must investigate each alarm triggered in 
order to determine its cause to avoid serious faults 
investigated by completing a checksheet for each 
triggering. To achieve this, the expert must plot and 
analyse a wide range of data such as the overall 
magnitude of vibration or eccentricity and operational 
parameters such as the generator load. For example, to 
assess an overall vibration alarm, the expert would 
need to record the overall vibration magnitude, the 
overall vibration zone, the magnitude and phase of 1"' 
and 2"d order vibrations and the amplitude and 
frequency of the non-synchronous vibration, The 
expert must calculate if the overall vibration is genuine 
by summing the 1" and 2"d order magnitudes to check 
if they approximately equate to the overall vibration 
magnitude. Step changes in the 1" order vibration and 
significant changes in the Zd order vibration magnitude 
and phase are also recorded along with observed 
operational changes. These types of recorded data are 
known as checksheet entries. The checksheet 
commentary is also completed with the likely cause of 
alarm triggering and any action taken or recommended 
based on the cause. This is achieved through 
interpreting the checksheet findings along with further 
observations, based on past experience. For example 
the expert would consult FFT data to check for 
characteristics such as the second order peak being 
developing without detection. Each alarm is 
larger than the first order peak and narrow spikes 
occurring at multiples of the line frequency in order to 
check if the alarm has been triggered due to a signal 
fault. 
In some cases alarms may continually fire due to 
incorrectly set alarm limits. This problem arises for a 
variety of reasons such as incorrectly calibrated alarm 
limits for a particular turbine set or signal drift, caused 
by performance changes in the turbine. The expert is 
required to modify any incorrectly set alarm limits 
which are discovered during alarm diagnosis. Experts 
must also detect developing faults and diagnose faults 
which have occurred by locating alarm sequences and 
analysing multiple alarm CM data. 
A vast majority of the alarms triggered have no further 
operational consequence but still require considerable 
effort and expertise to assess. Large amounts of data 
are analysed by the expert in order to monitor alarm 
trends to locate incorrectly set alarm limits. A 
significant amount of expert time is required to 
manually monitor alarm sequences. This has led to the 
proposal of a DSS which will automate a proportion of 
the interpretation currently completed manually by the 
experts. Routine alarms of no further operational 
consequence will be assessed automatically and then 
checked and approved by the experts. The system will 
also automate the processing of alarm trends and 
sequences. This will focus the experts' time and 
knowledge on important faults affecting the 
performance of the turbine. 
4. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM 
SPECIFICATION 
The DSS will target the following areas which 
correlate closely to the tasks undertaken by the experts: 
Routine Alarm Assessment (RAA): Interpret 
routine alarm data to assess the cause of alarm 
Alarm Management (AM): Locates incorrectly set 
darm limits and suggest new limits. 
Alarm Watchdog (AW): Locates emerging faults 
on the turbine. 
Fault Diagnosis (FD): Diagnoses faults which 
have occurred on the turbine. 
The FD module is expected to utilise the functionality 
of the other three modules. The modules will be 
designed and implemented in the order shown. IS 
techniques [5 ]  are suited to the processing required of 
each module in their ability to automatically emulate 
the experts interpretation of the data. Applying these 
techniques acts as an automated first inspection of the 
data, which highlights alarms of no further operational 
consequence as well as trends and sequences in need of 
closer inspection. 
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5. KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING 
The first stage in the design of the RAA module was to 
capture and document the knowledge required to assess 
alarms. This process is known as knowledge 
engineering and requires the expert to participate in 
knowledge eticitation exercises [4]. The resulting 
knowledge captured is recorded in transcripts to be 
validated by the expert. The transcript knowledge i s  
modelled using modelling methodologies such as 
CommonKADS [4]. Once validated by the expert, the 
models act as the blueprint for the module design. This 
design approach is shown in figure 1. 
5.1. Knowledge Elicitation 
The two main sources of alarm assessment knowledge 
identified were documentation and the CM experts. A 
flow chart was acquired which provided an 
understanding of the process used by BE CM experts 
to assess routine alarms. General information on 
turbines and common turbine faults was acquired from 
operational manuals and documentation acquired from 
previous projects respectively. To acquire the non- 
documented knowledge on assessing routine alarms the 
expert participated in knowledge elicitation [4]. 
Structured interviews and protocol analysis were the 
selected technique for the knowledge dicitation 
process. Protocol analysis was used to observe the 
expert assess routine alarms in the form of case studies. 
This form of interview developed an understanding of 
the methodology applied to the problem and how it 
was divided into sub-tasks. Structured interviews were 
used to capture the application specific knowledge 
such as defining observations mathematically, rules 
associated with each observation and knowledge on the 
structure of the equipment. Observations made on the 
experts approach to the alarm assessment task during 
protocol analysis were also reviewed. The following 
section describes the outcomes from the knowledge 
elicitation. 
6. EXPERT APPROACH TO ALARM 
ASSESSMENT 
Alarm assessment requires the completion of the alarm 
checksheet. The alarm checksheet is a document 
which prompts the expert to gather and summarise the 
key information associated with the triggered alarm. 
The expert must populate both the entry and 
commentary sections to complete the checksheet. 
Entries are completed by recording signal variables 
such as the overall magnitude of vibration or a change 
in an operational parameter. Commentary requires the 
cause of the alarm to he recorded. Both checksheet 
entries and commentary are discussed in section 3. 
The possible cause of the alarm can be defined by one 
of the following high level classifications: 
Genuine machine change - change in machine 
behaviour such as a machine fault 
Operational change - change in operational 
parameter such as an increase in generator load 
which causes an equivalent change in other 
parameters such as overall vibration 
Signal drift - signal temporarily moves outside of 
alarm limits 
Sensor error - incorrect signal measurement 
Further sub-classifications exist for each high Ievel 
classification. For example, ‘electrical noise’ and ‘no 
signal’ are more detailed ‘sensor error’ classifications. 
The expert applies knowledge to both checksheet entry 
data and observations based on previous experience of 
alarm assessment in  order to classify the alarm. 
Examples of these observations are locating signal 
trends. or detecting correlating step changes in separate 
signals, The type of knowledge applied is in the form 
of cause and effect statements and so a rule-based 
reasoning [5 ]  approach was selected as the most 
suitable IS technique. For exampte when assessing a 
1’’ order vibration alarm an operational change is 
observed in the generator load and is recorded in the 
appropriate entry of the checksheet. This suggests that 
the generator load may have triggered the alarm and so 
the expert may observe the following: 
generator load is observed to trend upwards then 
down wards. 
i” order magnitude vibration and generator load 
exhibit a closely correlating trend upwards then 
downwards at approximately the time of alarm 
triggering 
no other suspect changes are observed in other 
relevant signals 
If the generator load trends upwards and downwards at 
approximately the same time as the alarm and this 
correlates closely with the Ist order vibration signal 
then this suggests that the alarm was caused by an 
operational change. If no other suspect changes are 
observed in other relevant signals then this can confirm 
than the alarm was fired due to an operational change 
or more specifically a generator load operational 
change. 
Knowledge of turbine component locations and 
’ relationships influences the types of data the expert 
analyses. For example, generator stator current and 
generator V a s  are of more interest than HP governor 
valve positions when assessing an alarm positioned at 
the generator end of the turbine. The alarm assessment 
process consists of two stages of analysis: 
Identify classification candidate 
Specify classification 
AI1 checksheet entries are completed and possible 
alarm classifications conjectured for each alarm 
following the ‘identify classification candidate’ 
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analysis. The expert uses schematic knowledge of the 
turbine to select relevant data plots to analyse. For 
example, generator load data would be plotted if the 
alarm triggered at the generator end. Checksheet 
entries are completed as described in section 3. 
‘Identify classification candidate’ rules are then applied 
in order to generate possible classifications. For 
example, if an operational change has been observed 
then this may imply an operational change 
classification. 
‘Specify classification’ aims to confirm an alarm 
classification and hence complete the checksheet 
commentary. Results from the ‘identify classification 
candidate’ stage are used along with connectivity 
knowledge to decide what additional data is plotted. 
For instance an alarm positioned ai the generator end 
with a suspected operational change classification may 
lead the expert to plot the generator load and generator 
rotor current over a greater time period. Observations 
made using the new data are applied to ‘Specify 
classification’ rules in order to confirm the alarm 
classification. For example, the expert may classify an 
alarm as an operational change if a closely correlating 
upward and downward trend between the triggered 
parameter and an operational parameter is observed. 
This classification may only hold if no other suspect 
changes are observed in any other relevant signals. 
7. ROUTINE ALARM ASSESSMENT MODULE 
DESIGN 
Knowledge modelling methodologies allow knowledge 
to be represented in a graphical format. Representing 
knowledge in a graphical format enables easier 
communication of knowledge elicitation findings for 
validation by the experts and has been shown to be a 
useful tool in the design of knowledge based systems 
161. CommonKADS 141 is one such methodology 
which separates knowledge into three separate layers. 
These are: 
Task - Dissects the overall problem into smaller 
manageable tasks 
Inference - Outlines the reasoning steps required 
to achieve the tasks 
Domain - Knowledge specific to the application 
being modelled 
These three layers mapped closely with the alarm 
assessment knowledge captured and so both a task and 
inference model were constructed to represent the 
alarm classification process, as demonstrated by the 
CM experts. These models once constructed act as the 
foundation for the design of an RAA module. The 
alarm classification task model is shown in figure 3. 
‘Extract alarm details’ captures information on the 
alarm type and the time of firing from the CM display 
which indicates current active alarms. ‘Acquire raw 
signal’ captures the relevant data by processing these 
details with rule based knowledge. The data is then 
transformed by ‘Signal to symbol transformation’, 
enabling the data to be manipulated. ‘Identify 
classification candidate’ is divided into two sub-tasks. 
‘Assign classification grading’ processes the symbolic 
data with classification grading rules. A classification 
is then chosen by ‘Select classification candidate’, 
based on observations such as corresponding changes 
in load and vibration. New data must then be acquired 
and transformed to be processed by ‘Specify 
classification’, which is divided into two sub-tasks. 
‘Compare candidate data to knowledge’ processes the 
data with classification rules and passes the results to 
‘Evaluate classification candidate’, which passes or 
fails the candidate. If passed, the candidate becomes 
the alarm classification. If failed, a flag is passed to 
‘Select classification candidate’ for the next candidate 
to be assessed. For example if the most likely 
candidate is an operational change, then multiple 
operational parameters are acquired. If the operational 
parameters exhibit trends which confirm an operational 
change and no other suspect changes occur in other 
relevant signals, then this becomes the alarm 
classification. If an operational change was not 
confirmed then the next classification candidate, 
determined by ‘Assign classification grading’, is 
processed. The reasoning process described was then 
represented graphically by constructing an darm 
classification inference model as shown in figure 4. 
I 
Figure 3: Alarm Classification Task Model 
I m 
d- -. 
Figure 4: Alarm ClassXcaGon Inference Model 
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The next stage of the design process will be to expand 
the alarm classification task and inference models into 
RAA task and inference models. This should include 
task and inferences on haw the checksheet entries are 
completed. Existing tasks will be made less generic 
and more detailed if required. For instance a more 
detailed ‘Extract alarm details’ i s  shown in figure 5. 
Domain models must also be constructed for [he &arm 
assessment knowledge recorded in the knowledge 
elicitation transcripts. The system will be implemented 
onto a suitable software platform Once the level of 
detail required of a prototype RAA module sofrware 
design specification is realised. 
Figure 5: Detailed Task Model of Extract Alarm 
Details 
8. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM msrm AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The design and implementation of the AM and AW 
modules will follow the same process used for the 
M A  module. Expert knowledge on how these tasks 
are completed will be captured using the same 
knowledge elicitation approach described in section 5 
This knowledge will then be transcribed and modelled 
to create detailed module designs. 
The functionaliry of the RAA, AM and AW modules 
will be combined to create the FD module. The FD 
module will also use mathematical models of the 
turbine behaviour and fault models to increase it’s the 
level of diagnostjc support provided. The models will 
be utilised using model- based reasoning methods 171. 
Modci-based reasonhg methods are capable of 
diagnosing faults by locating discrepancies between the 
modelled behaviour and the actual behaviour. The 
discrepancy is then used to hypothesise what caused 
rhe discrepancy. Methods of combining model-based 
reasoning techniques and knowledge based reasoning 
techniques will he researched in order to impIement a 
full DSS. 
9. CONCLUSION 
The introduction of a DSS to the existing CM system 
will reduce che amount of time applied by the expert to 
ptocess tasks such as assessing routine alarms wiib no 
fulther operational consequence. enabling them to 
focus an more impomnt faults affecting the 
performance of the turbine. 
It was shown how protocol analysis and structured 
inferviewing techniques were used to capture the 
experts’ knowledge on assessing routine alarms. The 
CammonKADS modelling methodology has been 
shown as a useful technique in creating an RAA 
module design. The RAA module will act as the 
foundation for the design and implementation o€ the 
remaining modules and these will be brought together 
to realise a full alarm interpretation and fault diagnosis 
system. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The authors wish to thank British Energy for their 
financial support of this research. 
REFERENCES 
11)  Beran Instruments, www.beran.co.uk 
[Z] Gam“ I3 D, PhD Thesis ‘A Consultative Expefl 
System for lntclligent Diagnosis on Steam Turbine 
Plant’, University of Strathclyde, 1995 
131 MiZnc R, Trave-Massuyes L ‘Gas-Turbine 
Condition Monitoring Using Qualitative Model-Based 
Diagnosis’, IEEE Expert, May-Jun 1997, Vol 12, No 3, 
pp 22-31 
I41 Schreiber G, et al ‘Knowledge Engineering and 
Management, The CommonKADS Methodology’, The 
MIT Press. 2000 
[5 ]  Luger G F, Shlbblefield W A ‘Artificial 
Intelligence, Structures and Strategies for Complex 
Problem Solving’, third edirion, Wesley Longman, Inc 
161 Falconer W 7, West G M, McArthur S D J, 
McDonald J R ‘Re-Engineering a Turbine Generator 
Diagnostic Expert System to Support Plant Wide 
Condition Monitoring’, 38‘h International Universities 
Power Engineering Conference Proceedings, Voi I ,  pp 
249-252 
U ]  Davis R, Hamscher W ‘Model-Based Reasoning: 
Troubleshooting’, Readings In Modal-Based 
Diagnosis, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, pp 3-24 
Martin Todd 
Institute for Energy and Environment 
University of Strathclyde 
Glasgow, United Kingdom 
GI IKW 
437 
